PT-2026-45231 · Go · Github.Com/Mvt-Project/Androidqf
Published
2026-05-21
·
Updated
2026-05-21
CVSS v4.0
1.1
Low
| Vector | AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U |
Summary
generateZipPath() constructs zip entry names for collected APKs using device controlled content from extractFileName(). Since extractFileName() does not reject traversal sequences, the resulting zip entry name can contain ../. AndroidQF itself does not extract the zip it creates, but any forensic tool that extracts the acquisition bundle without zip-slip protection could write files to attacker chosen paths.Impact
A compromised device could inject path traversal sequences into the acquisition bundle's zip entry names. When a forensic analyst or forensic tooling extracts the bundle without entry name validation, files could be written outside the intended extraction directory.
Patched version
Credits
This issue was identified during a security assessment conducted by 0xche.
Fix
Path traversal
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Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Github.Com/Mvt-Project/Androidqf