PT-2026-45231 · Go · Github.Com/Mvt-Project/Androidqf

Published

2026-05-21

·

Updated

2026-05-21

CVSS v4.0

1.1

Low

VectorAV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U

Summary

generateZipPath() constructs zip entry names for collected APKs using device controlled content from extractFileName(). Since extractFileName() does not reject traversal sequences, the resulting zip entry name can contain ../. AndroidQF itself does not extract the zip it creates, but any forensic tool that extracts the acquisition bundle without zip-slip protection could write files to attacker chosen paths.

Impact

A compromised device could inject path traversal sequences into the acquisition bundle's zip entry names. When a forensic analyst or forensic tooling extracts the bundle without entry name validation, files could be written outside the intended extraction directory.

Patched version

Credits

This issue was identified during a security assessment conducted by 0xche.

Fix

Path traversal

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Weakness Enumeration

Related Identifiers

GHSA-JF2Q-463C-6F52

Affected Products

Github.Com/Mvt-Project/Androidqf