PT-2026-46990 · Go · Github.Com/Klever-Io/Klever-Go
Published
2026-06-05
·
Updated
2026-06-05
·
CVE-2026-47249
CVSS v3.1
7.5
High
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H |
Summary
A connected peer can send a compressed
RequestDataType HashArrayType direct request that is only 442 bytes on the wire but expands into 200000 decoded hash entries inside the resolver path. On klever-go v1.7.17, this allows remote memory and CPU amplification against nodes that accept P2P peer connections.Details
Resolver antiflood logic accounts only one logical message and the compressed wire size in
data/retriever/resolvers/messageProcessor.go#L30.Batch.Decompress() in data/batch/batch.go#L122 enforces an inflated byte cap but does not enforce a decoded repeated-field item cap. After decompression, TxResolver preallocates and iterates all decoded hashes in data/retriever/resolvers/transactionResolver.go#L194, and TrieNodeResolver iterates the same unchecked decoded set in data/retriever/resolvers/trieNodeResolver.go#L108.Pinned references:
- https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/retriever/resolvers/messageProcessor.go#L30
- https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/batch/batch.go#L122
- https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/retriever/resolvers/transactionResolver.go#L194
- https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/retriever/resolvers/trieNodeResolver.go#L108
This appears distinct from the public
CVE-2026-44697 / GHSA-87m7-qffr-542v, which covered MultiDataInterceptor compressed batch fan-in. This report concerns resolver request paths that remain reachable through real libp2p direct-send plumbing on v1.7.17.PoC
Reproduced with:
go run auditpoc/request batch hash amplification poc.go
go test github.com/klever-io/klever-go/auditpoc -run TestRequestBatchHashAmplification DirectSendReachability -count=1
Observed output:
request wire bytes: 442
fits direct-send limit (983040 bytes): true
tx resolver lookups: 200000
trie resolver lookups: 200000
heap delta before first tx lookup: 17.47 MiB
ok github.com/klever-io/klever-go/auditpoc
The E2E harness registers the victim resolver on the request topic and sends the malicious payload through
SendToConnectedPeer() to prove the work amplification survives the real direct-send path.Impact
A connected peer can convert a sub-kilobyte request into large decode-time memory pressure and synchronous CPU work on the target node. Repeated requests or several concurrent peers can degrade or exhaust validator resources, affecting node availability.
Fix
Resource Exhaustion
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Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Github.Com/Klever-Io/Klever-Go