PT-2026-47542 · Go · Github.Com/Juev/Nebula-Mesh
Published
2026-06-08
·
Updated
2026-06-08
CVSS v4.0
7.0
High
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
Every
/ui/* POST / PUT / PATCH / DELETE route processes the request as soon as the session cookie validates. SameSite=Lax on the session cookie prevents most cross-site form submits but does not protect:- top-level form-submit navigations from third-party pages (some browsers still send Lax cookies on top-level POSTs)
- same-registrable-domain attackers (sibling-subdomain XSS, subdomain takeover)
- the
GET /ui/logoutroute, which a third-party<img src=".../ui/logout">can force-trigger
The admin UI signs CA certificates, mints API keys, rotates / retires / deletes CAs, disables operators, and changes server settings. CSRF here is a real privilege escalation, not just annoyance.
Affected
All released versions up to v0.3.2.
Suggested fix
Double-submit cookie: a 32-byte
crypto/rand token in a non-HttpOnly csrf cookie, echoed in either X-CSRF-Token (htmx) or a csrf form field (HTML forms). Compared in constant time. Rotated on every privilege transition (Login, OIDC StartAuthenticatedSession, CompleteTwoFactor, Logout) so pre-auth fixation cannot survive promotion. Rejections audit-logged as ui.csrf.rejected with reason; response body stays opaque./ui/logout becomes POST so it is no longer reachable via <img> tags.Fix coordinates with the Secure-cookie advisory disclosed concurrently — the
csrf cookie inherits the same Secure-attribute derivation.Reproducer
With an authenticated operator session in browser tab A, open the following minimal HTML in any other tab:
<form action="https://nebula.example.com/ui/cas/{ca-id}/delete" method="POST">
<button>Click for free puppy</button>
</form>
Click. The CA is deleted — the server processes the POST because the session cookie is automatically attached and there is no other check. The same trick works for force-rotate, retire, mint API keys, disable operators, etc.
Alternative force-logout:
<img src="https://nebula.example.com/ui/logout"> placed on an attacker's page logs out any visiting authenticated operator. No interaction required.Notes
- Multipart and JSON endpoints don't exist in the current UI surface. Future additions must rely on the header path because
r.PostFormValueonly readsapplication/x-www-form-urlencodedbodies. The middleware's package comment documents this. - The patch assumes nebula-mgmt is the sole authority on its registrable domain. A compromised sibling subdomain can still set parent-domain cookies and forge matches; SameSite=Lax does not prevent that. Documented in the patch.
Fix
Improper Privilege Management
CSRF
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Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Github.Com/Juev/Nebula-Mesh