PT-2026-48436 · Roxy-Wi · Roxy-Wi
Published
2026-06-10
·
Updated
2026-06-10
·
CVE-2026-45556
CVSS v3.1
9.9
Critical
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H |
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, POST /waf///rule//save accepts a config file name form field that is passed straight through to config mod.master slave upload and restart(...) as the destination path. The validation chain ( replace config path to correct → check is conf) only requires the path to contain a hard-coded service substring (nginx/haproxy/apache2/httpd/keepalived) and the substring conf or cfg, and to not contain ... The encoded-slash substitution 92 → / is applied before the substring check, so the attacker can build any absolute path anywhere on the LB filesystem as long as it satisfies those substring constraints. The body of the WAF rule (config form field) is written verbatim to that path. By choosing a filename like 92etc92cron.d92nginx cfg evil (resolving to /etc/cron.d/nginx cfg evil), an attacker drops a cron entry on the load balancer with attacker-controlled content. Cron parses the file on its next scan, executing the embedded job as root — full RCE on every load balancer the caller's group manages. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
Fix
RCE
Path traversal
OS Command Injection
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Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Roxy-Wi