PT-2026-48437 · Roxy-Wi · Roxy-Wi
and the PUT / global / defaults variants) accept a JSON option field that is not validated, not escaped, and is rendered verbatim into the generated HAProxy configuration via the section.j2, global.j2, and defaults.j2 Ansible templates. Because Roxy-WI then pushes the generated config to the load balancer and runs systemctl reload haproxy, an authenticated user with role ≤ 3 (user) can inject arbitrary HAProxy directives into the config that runs on every load balancer their group manages — including option external-check + external-check command /bin/bash -c '…', which gives remote code execution on the load balancer as the haproxy user on every health-check tick. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
Published
2026-06-10
·
Updated
2026-06-10
·
CVE-2026-45558
CVSS v3.1
9.9
Critical
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H |
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the HAProxy section-save endpoints (POST /api/service/haproxy//section/
Fix
Code Injection
Command Injection
RCE
OS Command Injection
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Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Roxy-Wi