PT-2026-48925 · Swifturl · Github.Com/Apple/Swift-Nio

Published 2026-06-12 · Updated 2026-06-12 · CVE-2026-28980

OSV

CVSS v4.0

8.7

High

Base vector

AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Summary

The HTTPDecoder in NIOHTTP1 enforces no limit on the total size of an HTTP/1 message's header block or on the number of header fields per message. A remote peer can submit an arbitrary number of small, valid headers in a single request and have them all accumulated into the resulting HTTPHeaders value before any application code runs. This can be used to exhaust memory, or — for consumers that subsequently convert headers into swift-http-types' HTTPFields — to crash the process.

Details

HTTPDecoder previously enforced only a single hardcoded parsing limit: 80 KB per individual header field (name + value). There was no cap on the cumulative size of the header block, nor on the number of header fields per message. Because each individual field can remain well below the 80 KB threshold, a peer can submit hundreds of thousands of valid headers in a single request, all of which are appended to the decoded HTTPHeaders without bound.

The headers are then visible to user code through the standard HTTPServerRequestPart.head / HTTPClientResponsePart.head events. Two observed downstream effects:

• Hummingbird 2 (and other consumers that bridge HTTPHeaders into swift-http-types' HTTPFields) crashes via a precondition failure inside HTTPFields once the configured field count is exceeded.
• Vapor 4 does not crash, but the per-request memory footprint scales linearly with the number of headers received, allowing a single connection to inflate server memory use substantially.

Impact

A single unauthenticated remote peer can trigger a denial of service against any HTTP/1 server (or, in the response direction, any HTTP/1 client) built on NIOHTTP1 — either by crashing the process, depending on the downstream framework, or by driving the process's resident memory to arbitrary sizes.

Patches

This issue is addressed in swift-nio 2.100.0 and later.

The HTTPDecoder now applies three parsing limits with conservative defaults, exposed through the new NIOHTTPDecoderLimitConfiguration type:

Limit	Default
maxHeaderFieldSize	80 KB
maxHeaderListSize	2 MB
maxHeaderFieldCount	256

Exceeding any of these limits causes the decoder to fail with HTTPParserError.headerOverflow. The configuration can be supplied directly to HTTPRequestDecoder / HTTPResponseDecoder, or via the decoderConfiguration property on NIOUpgradableHTTPServerPipelineConfiguration and NIOUpgradableHTTPClientPipelineConfiguration.

Users who require larger limits — for example, applications that legitimately exchange very large header blocks — can opt into them explicitly by constructing a custom NIOHTTPDecoderLimitConfiguration.

Workarounds

Users unable to upgrade can mitigate by placing a reverse proxy in front of the service that enforces equivalent limits on request header count and total header size.

Credit

This issue was reported by @Joannis. SwiftNIO thanks @Joannis for the report and the support in landing the fix.

Fix

Resource Exhaustion

Allocation of Resources Without Limits

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-400

CWE-770

Related Identifiers

CVE-2026-28980

GHSA-RJ37-6J9X-74Q6

Affected Products

Github.Com/Apple/Swift-Nio

References · 3

• https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-rj37-6j9x-74q6 · Vendor Advisory
• https://github.com/apple/swift-nio · Note
• https://github.com/apple/swift-nio/security/advisories/GHSA-rj37-6j9x-74q6 · Note