PT-2026-50394 · Zephyrproject · Zephyr
Published
2026-06-17
·
Updated
2026-06-17
·
CVE-2026-10641
CVSS v3.1
7.1
High
| Vector | AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H |
Zephyr's Bluetooth Classic Hands-Free Profile (HFP) Hands-Free role parser (subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/hfp hf.c) contains an out-of-bounds write. During Service Level Connection setup the HF sends AT+CIND=? and parses the AG's +CIND: response in cind handle(), which assigns a per-entry counter index and calls cind handle values() for each list element. cind handle values() then wrote hf-ind table[index] = i without verifying that index is within the 20-element int8 t ind table[] array of struct bt hfp hf. Because the parser places no cap on the number of +CIND: list entries, a remote Attendant Gateway (a malicious, compromised, or spoofed peer the device connects to over Bluetooth) can send a response with more than 20 recognized indicator entries and drive index arbitrarily large, writing a small attacker-positioned value past the array into adjacent struct fields (feature masks, SDP/version state, the calls[] array, work/atomic bookkeeping) and potentially beyond the static connection pool slot. This yields memory corruption and at least denial of service of the Bluetooth host, triggered by a single malformed AT response with no user interaction. The sibling consumer ag indicator handle values() already performed the equivalent bounds check; this commit adds the same index = ARRAY SIZE(hf-ind table) guard to close the gap. Affects builds with CONFIG BT HFP HF enabled; introduced with the original HFP HF CIND parser (~v1.7) and present through v4.4.0.
Exploit
Fix
Memory Corruption
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Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Zephyr