PT-2026-50425 · Rxi · Microtar
Saidakbarxon Maxsudxonov
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Published
2026-06-17
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Updated
2026-06-17
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CVE-2026-55738
CVSS v3.1
8.8
High
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
A stack-based buffer overflow exists in the raw to header() function in src/microtar.c in rxi microtar 0.1.0. The function copies the 100-byte name and linkname fields of a TAR header with strcpy() without guaranteeing null termination of the source. The POSIX ustar format permits these fixed-width fields to be fully populated with non-null bytes, so a crafted archive whose linkname field (followed by the trailing padding of the 512-byte raw header) contains no null terminator causes strcpy() to read past the end of the 512-byte raw header stack buffer and to write past the destination header buffer. A remote attacker who supplies a crafted TAR archive that the victim opens or parses (via mtar open(), mtar read header(), or mtar find()) can cause an out-of-bounds read and a stack buffer overflow, resulting in denial of service (crash) and potentially arbitrary code execution. Confirmed with AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow READ of size 356 in raw to header at src/microtar.c:112.
Fix
Stack Overflow
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Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Microtar