PT-2026-50480 · Pypi · Open-Webui

Published 2026-06-17 · Updated 2026-06-17 · CVE-2026-54008

OSV

CVSS v3.1

8.5

High

Base vector

AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

Summary

backend/open webui/utils/oauth.py:: process picture url (v0.9.5, lines 1435-1470) calls validate url(picture url) on the initial URL only, then invokes aiohttp.ClientSession.get(picture url, ...) without allow redirects=False. aiohttp's default is allow redirects=True, max redirects=10; the function does not pass the project's AIOHTTP CLIENT ALLOW REDIRECTS env constant either. An attacker with a valid OAuth IdP identity can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address and read the internal response body via the attacker's own profile image url field.

This is the same redirect-bypass class as CVE-2026-45401 (GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6), on a 6th call site that the v0.9.5 patch missed. CVE-2026-45401's advisory body enumerates exactly five affected paths — SafeWebBaseLoader. scrape, fetch, get content from url, load url image, get image base64 from url — none in utils/oauth.py.

Vulnerable code (v0.9.5)

backend/open webui/utils/oauth.py, lines 1435-1470:

async def process picture url(self, picture url: str, access token: str = None) -> str:
  if not picture url:
    return '/user.png'
  try:
    validate url(picture url)               # initial URL only

    get kwargs = {}
    if access token:
      get kwargs['headers'] = {'Authorization': f'Bearer {access token}'}
    async with aiohttp.ClientSession(trust env=True) as session:
      async with session.get(picture url, **get kwargs,
                  ssl=AIOHTTP CLIENT SESSION SSL) as resp:
      #            ^^^^^^^^^^^ no allow redirects=False
        if resp.ok:
          picture = await resp.read()
          base64 encoded picture = base64.b64encode(picture).decode('utf-8')
          guessed mime type = mimetypes.guess type(picture url)[0]
          if guessed mime type is None:
            guessed mime type = 'image/jpeg'
          return f'data:{guessed mime type};base64,{base64 encoded picture}'
        ...

The function is invoked at oauth.py:1556 (new-user OAuth signup) and oauth.py:1536 (existing-user picture update on login). Neither call site re-validates after redirect-following.

backend/open webui/retrieval/web/utils.py (v0.9.5) imports the env constant AIOHTTP CLIENT ALLOW REDIRECTS at line 51 and uses it on the five paths patched by CVE-2026-45401. utils/oauth.py does not import or reference it.

Exploitation

Preconditions:

• ENABLE OAUTH SIGNUP=true or OAUTH UPDATE PICTURE ON LOGIN=true (common in production OAuth-IdP deployments)
• Attacker has a valid identity on the configured OAuth IdP (Google, Microsoft, GitHub, or any generic OIDC provider)

Steps:

1. Attacker hosts a redirect endpoint at http://attacker.example/r on a public IP. validate url("http://attacker.example/r") returns True (is global=True for public IPs).
2. Attacker sets their IdP picture claim to http://attacker.example/r.
3. Attacker signs in to open-webui via OAuth. open-webui invokes process picture url("http://attacker.example/r", ...).
4. validate url accepts the public URL. session.get("http://attacker.example/r") is invoked.
5. attacker.example responds HTTP/1.1 302 Foundr Location: http://127.0.0.1:11434/api/tags. (Or http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/, RFC1918 internal services, etc.)
6. aiohttp follows the redirect server-side. No re-validation.
7. The internal response body is read into picture, base64-encoded, and stored as profile image url = "data:image/jpeg;base64,..." on the attacker's account.
8. Attacker reads back via GET /api/v1/auths/. Decode the base64 payload to get the full internal response body.

Impact

Full-read SSRF, identical read-back primitive to CVE-2026-45338:

• Cloud metadata services (AWS IMDSv1 at 169.254.169.254, GCP metadata.google.internal, Azure IMDS) → IAM credentials, managed-identity tokens
• Localhost-bound services (Ollama at :11434, Redis, Elasticsearch, internal Postgres exporters)
• RFC1918 internal infrastructure not exposed to the internet

Distinction from prior CVEs

Prior CVE	This finding	Distinguishing fact
CVE-2026-45338 (GHSA-24c9)	process picture url had no validate url() call at all	Fixed in v0.9.0 by adding the call. Ours is the call being insufficient because it doesn't loop over redirect targets. Different mechanism, different fix.
CVE-2026-45400 (GHSA-8w7q)	validate url() had urlparse-vs-requests parser disagreement on @ chars	Fixed in v0.9.5 by char-blocklist. Ours is post-validation redirect-following — orthogonal mechanism.
CVE-2026-45401 (GHSA-rh5x)	Five paths in retrieval, routers/images, utils/files, utils/middleware	Parent class. Same CWE-918 redirect-bypass mechanism. utils/oauth.py:: process picture url is not among the five paths in the parent advisory's "Affected code paths" section. Same class, missed sink. Direct sibling.

Suggested fix

async with session.get(
  picture url,
  **get kwargs,
  ssl=AIOHTTP CLIENT SESSION SSL,
  allow redirects=AIOHTTP CLIENT ALLOW REDIRECTS,  # add
) as resp:

Or, if redirects must remain enabled by default, wrap in a manual-follow loop that re-invokes validate url() on each Location header. This mirrors the fix shape applied to the five paths in CVE-2026-45401.

Affected versions

Vulnerable: <= 0.9.5 Fix: 0.9.6

References

• CVE-2026-45401 / GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6 (parent cluster, redirect-bypass on 5 paths)
• CVE-2026-45338 / GHSA-24c9-2m8q-qhmh (original process picture url SSRF, patched v0.9.0)
• CVE-2026-45400 / GHSA-8w7q-q5jp-jvgx (validate url parser-disagreement bypass, patched v0.9.5)
• open-webui issue #24560 (corroborates that the v0.9.5 redirect-fix was applied piecemeal across call sites)

Proof of Concept

End-to-end PoC executed against ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:v0.9.5 in Docker compose. Three services: attacker (OIDC IdP + 302-redirect endpoint on evil.example.com:9001/redirect), canary (internal target on internal-target.local:9002/sentinel), open-webui v0.9.5.

Fresh-CSPRNG sentinel generated after OAuth state-establishing call (per Gate 5.5 oracle protocol): SSRF-POC-5580111b2a0d7d0c8324bfa92a0d9d09.

Result:

• profile image url field after OAuth login: 
• Base64 decode: SSRF-POC-5580111b2a0d7d0c8324bfa92a0d9d09 (byte-for-byte sentinel match)
• Canary log: !!! SSRF HIT - sentinel served

Chain confirmed: OAuth login → IdP returns picture claim evil.example.com:9001/redirect → validate url() accepts FQDN → aiohttp.ClientSession.get(...) follows 302 to internal-target.local:9002/sentinel server-side without re-validation → response body base64-encoded into attacker's profile image url → readable via GET /api/v1/auths/.

PoC artifacts (compose, attacker server, canary, run/verify scripts, full transcript) available on request.

Reporter

Matteo Panzeri — GitHub: matte1782, contact: [e-mail]. Requesting CVE credit as Matteo Panzeri.

Fix

SSRF

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-918

Related Identifiers

CVE-2026-54008

GHSA-226F-F24G-524W

Affected Products

Open-Webui

References · 3

• https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-226f-f24g-524w · Vendor Advisory
• https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-226f-f24g-524w · Note
• https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui · Note