PT-2026-52094 · Rocket.Chat · Rocket.Chat
Published
2026-06-24
·
Updated
2026-06-24
·
CVE-2026-45689
CVSS v3.1
9.1
Critical
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N |
Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11, an unauthenticated network attacker obtains a valid Rocket.Chat OAuth access token for an arbitrary user by sending a single HTTP POST with MongoDB query operators to /oauth/token. The Rocket.Chat OAuth2 server does not validate that grant parameters are strings before forwarding them to findOne({...}) against the oauth apps and oauth access tokens collections, so an attacker substitutes {"$ne": null} for client id, client secret, and refresh token and receives a freshly minted {access token, refresh token} pair bound to whichever user's refresh token Mongo returned first. The resulting access token is a first-class bearer credential against the full /api/v1/* surface as that user. By iterating with $nin / $regex operators the attacker walks the entire oauth access tokens collection, collecting one fresh access token per user per request. If any matched token belongs to an admin, the stolen bearer gives full admin API access (including Apps-Engine app installation, i.e. server-side code execution). No account, credentials, userId, or prior interaction with the instance are required. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11.
Fix
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Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Rocket.Chat