PT-2026-52282 · Linux · Linux
Published
2026-06-25
·
Updated
2026-06-25
·
CVE-2026-53186
None
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/srp: bound SRP RSP sense copy by the received length
srp process rsp() copies sense data from rsp->data + resp data len,
where resp data len is the full 32-bit value supplied by the SRP target
and is never checked against the number of bytes actually received
(wc->byte len). The copy length is bounded to SCSI SENSE BUFFERSIZE, so
at most 96 bytes are copied, but the source offset is not bounded.
A malicious or compromised SRP target on the InfiniBand/RoCE fabric that
the initiator has logged into can return an SRP RSP with
SRP RSP FLAG SNSVALID set and a large resp data len. The receive buffer
is allocated at the target-chosen max ti iu len, so the source of the
sense copy lands past the bytes actually received; with resp data len
near 0xFFFFFFFF it is gigabytes past the buffer and the read faults.
Copy the sense data only if it has not been truncated, that is, only if
the response header, the response data, and the sense region fit within
the bytes actually received; otherwise drop the sense and log. The
in-tree iSER and NVMe-RDMA receive paths already bound their parse by
wc->byte len; this brings ib srp into line with them.
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Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Linux