PT-2026-53129 — Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity in Pypi Praisonai

PT-2026-53129 · Pypi · Praisonai

Published

2026-06-18

Updated

2026-06-18

CVSS v3.1

8.8

High

Vector

AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

DiscordApproval accepts unrelated channel messages as dangerous-tool approvals

Summary

praisonai.bots.DiscordApproval approves a pending dangerous tool call when it sees any later non-bot message in the configured Discord channel whose text is classified as approval, such as yes.

The decision is not bound to:

a Discord reply to the approval message;
a Discord thread created for that request;
a Discord interaction/button callback for that request;
an explicit approver user allowlist; or
an approval nonce visible only to intended approvers.

As a result, any user who can post in the configured approval channel can approve a pending high-risk tool call by sending yes after the approval message appears. The same local PoV also shows that the Slack and Telegram messaging approval backends have no explicit approver allowlist parameter, but the primary report-grade issue is the Discord backend's unthreaded channel cross-talk: the approving message does not need to be a reply or otherwise request-bound.

Affected Product

Repository: MervinPraison/PraisonAI
Ecosystem: pip
Package: praisonai
Component: Python messaging approval backends
Primary affected file: src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/ discord approval.py
Related sibling files:
src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/ slack approval.py
src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/ telegram approval.py
Latest PyPI version validated: 4.6.58
Current origin/main validated: 1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e
Current origin/main tag validated: v4.6.58

Suggested affected range:

text

pip:praisonai >= 4.5.2, <= 4.6.58

Representative local sweep:

text

4.5.0  Discord approval backend not present
4.5.2  vulnerable
4.5.128 vulnerable
4.6.9  vulnerable
4.6.10  vulnerable
4.6.56  vulnerable
4.6.57  vulnerable
4.6.58  vulnerable

Root Cause

DiscordApproval.request approval() posts an approval message to the configured channel and records the returned message id.

poll for response() then polls channel history with:

python

f"/channels/{channel id}/messages?after={message id}&limit=10"

For each later non-bot message, it reads content, classifies the text, and returns ApprovalDecision(approved=True) when the text is approve/yes. There is no check that the message is a Discord reply to the approval message, belongs to a request-specific thread, came from an intended approver, or contains a request-specific approval token.

Important source evidence from origin/main:

discord approval.py lines 57-73: constructor accepts token, channel id, timeout, and poll interval; no approver allowlist.
discord approval.py line 239: polls all messages after the approval message in the configured channel.
discord approval.py lines 252-265: skips bot messages, classifies the remaining text, and approves when the keyword is approve.

The Slack and Telegram backends are better request-scoped than Discord:

Slack uses conversations.replies for the approval message thread.
Telegram checks the callback/reply message id.

However, both still lack an explicit approver identity parameter. They are included in the PoV and suggested fix because the authorization model should be consistent across all messaging approval backends.

Local PoV

Run against the latest local checkout:

bash

python3 poc/pov prai cand 029 messaging approval channel member bypass.py 
 --repo ../../artifacts/repos/praisonai-v4.6.58 
 --json

The PoV is local-only. It mocks Slack, Telegram, and Discord API helpers in-process and does not contact those services.

For Discord, the mock sequence is:

DiscordApproval posts a critical execute command approval request to D APPROVAL CHANNEL.
The mocked channel-history endpoint returns a later ordinary non-bot channel message from D INTRUDER with content yes.
DiscordApproval returns approved=True and approver="D INTRUDER".

Observed output from evidence/pov-v4.6.58.json:

json

{
 "approval from unconfigured channel participant": {
  "discord": true,
  "slack": true,
  "telegram": true
 },
 "backends": [
  {
   "backend": "discord",
   "configured channel id": "D APPROVAL CHANNEL",
   "decision approved": true,
   "decision approver": "D INTRUDER",
   "decision reason": "Approved via Discord by intruder",
   "intruder user": "D INTRUDER"
  }
 ],
 "no explicit approver allowlist parameters": true,
 "vulnerable": true
}

The command in the approval request is a harmless local sentinel: touch /tmp/prai-cand-029. The PoV stops at the approval decision; it does not execute the tool.

Why This Is Not Intended Behavior

This report does not claim that a deliberately private approval channel with only trusted approvers is unsafe by itself. The narrower issue is that the Discord backend treats an unrelated later channel message as the approval decision for a specific dangerous tool request.

PraisonAI's approval documentation describes approval as a safety control that pauses before dangerous tools and asks a human or channel to allow or deny the specific request. A random later yes in the channel is not evidence that an intended approver reviewed that request.

The existing Slack and Telegram implementations already show request-binding patterns that Discord lacks:

Slack scopes to replies for the approval message timestamp.
Telegram checks the callback/reply message id.

The Discord backend should provide at least the same request binding and should also support explicit approver identity checks for deployments where channel membership is broader than approval authority.

Impact

If an application uses DiscordApproval for dangerous tools such as shell commands, file writes, deletes, deployments, or other privileged operations, a low-privileged Discord user with write access to the configured approval channel can approve pending dangerous tool executions.

This can lead to code execution, file modification, deployment changes, or data access with the privileges of the PraisonAI process, depending on which tools the agent exposes behind approval.

The attacker does not need the LLM API key, shell access, repository access, or PraisonAI process access. They only need to be able to post an approval-looking message in the configured approval channel after the approval prompt appears.

Severity

Suggested severity: High.

Rationale:

AV: the attacker interacts through a networked Discord channel.
AC: sending yes after an approval prompt is enough.
PR: the attacker needs permission to post in the configured approval channel, but no approver-specific permission.
UI: no separate victim interaction is needed after the prompt exists.
S: the vulnerable approval backend and approved tool run in the PraisonAI application's security scope.
C/I/A: approved dangerous tools can disclose, modify, or destroy data depending on the configured agent tools.

Remediation

Recommended fixes:

For Discord, require approvals to be tied to the request, not merely any later channel message. Use Discord interactions/buttons with opaque server-side request ids, or require a Discord reply whose message reference.message id matches the approval message.
Add explicit approver identity configuration to all messaging approval backends, for example approver user ids or allowed approvers.
Reject approvals from users outside the configured approver set, even if the message appears in the configured channel.
Include a per-request nonce or opaque approval id in callbacks and verify it server side before returning ApprovalDecision(approved=True).
Add regression tests for Discord where:

an unrelated later yes in the channel is ignored;
a reply from a non-approver is ignored;
a request-bound reply/callback from an allowed approver succeeds.

Fix

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Incorrect Authorization

Found an issue in the description? Have something to add? Feel free to write us 👾

dbugs@ptsecurity.com

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-345CWE-863

Related Identifiers

GHSA-8579-RGG5-PH2M

Affected Products

Praisonai