PT-2026-53785 · Crates.Io · Surrealdb

Published

2026-06-19

·

Updated

2026-06-19

CVSS v3.1

4.3

Medium

VectorAV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
A record user could read field values hidden from them by field-level SELECT permissions by reaching the records through a graph-edge (->) or back-reference (<~) traversal instead of a direct SELECT.
When a table was readable at the table level but carried a field hidden by a field-level permission (DEFINE FIELD secret ON knows PERMISSIONS FOR select NONE), a direct SELECT * FROM knows hid secret — but reaching the same records through a traversal that yields full objects — person:bob->(SELECT * FROM knows), person:bob<~(SELECT * FROM comment), or a projected target vertex ->knows->(SELECT * FROM person) — returned it intact.
The root cause: the shared resolve record batch helper used by GraphEdgeScan (FullEdge) and ReferenceScan (FullRecord) enforced only the table-level SELECT permission and pushed raw record data, never running the field-level filtering (build field state / filter fields by permission) that ordinary table scans and fetch record apply.

Impact

A record user can read the values of fields hidden by field-level SELECT permissions, on tables they already hold table-level SELECT on, by materialising the records through a graph-edge, back-reference, or target-vertex traversal — recovering the values directly, for every record the traversal returns.
The disclosure is confined to the field-permission layer: it grants no unauthorised cross-table, cross-record, or cross-namespace/database access. The table's own SELECT permission — including any row-level WHERE predicate — is still enforced, so the caller only reaches records they were already entitled to read; only the per-field SELECT filtering within those records is skipped. Root and record-owner sessions are unaffected, and data cannot be modified (confidentiality only).
Table-level enforcement on these traversals landed in 3.1.0 (the fix for GHSA-vjjx-rfw4-rmfc); releases before 3.1.0 additionally exposed whole records on tables the caller could not read, and are covered by that advisory.

Patches

resolve record batch (the shared helper that materialises full records for graph and reference traversals) now applies field-level SELECT permissions and read-time COMPUTED fields to each record, matching the regular table-scan and fetch record paths.
Versions 3.1.5 and later are not affected.

Workarounds

  • Force the unaffected legacy executor with --planner-strategy compute-only (env SURREAL PLANNER STRATEGY).
  • Do not rely on field-level SELECT permissions to hide values on tables reachable as a graph edge, reference target, or traversal vertex; restrict at the table level instead.
  • Use namespace / database isolation as the primary boundary where feasible.

References

Fix

Incorrect Authorization

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Weakness Enumeration

CWE-863

Related Identifiers

GHSA-HV6H-HC26-Q48P

Affected Products

Surrealdb