PT-2026-53804 · Pypi · Stigmem-Node

Published

2026-06-19

·

Updated

2026-06-19

CVSS v4.0

8.6

High

VectorAV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Summary

On a multi-tenant stigmem node, a tenant administrator could list, read, and admit or reject quarantined facts belonging to other tenants. The list/count queries and get quarantined fact in routes/quarantine.py lacked an f.tenant id = identity.tenant id predicate, and the garden lookup was not tenant-scoped — reached via the /v1/quarantine list and admit/reject endpoints.

Impact

Cross-tenant confidentiality (reading another tenant's quarantined content) and cross-tenant integrity (moderating — admitting or rejecting — another tenant's facts), gated only by a plain tenant write capability rather than a node-level admin authority.

Affected configurations

This is a cross-tenant break. It is exploitable only on deployments running the opt-in stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant (multiple tenants on one node). A default single-tenant node has only tenant="default" — there is no second tenant to cross — so it is not exploitable on default deployments. The rating is HIGH for the multi-tenant deployments the plugin exists to isolate.

Patches

Fixed in 0.9.0a12 (PR #728): AND f.tenant id = identity.tenant id was added to the list/count queries and get quarantined fact; the garden lookup is now tenant-scoped; and any genuinely cross-tenant moderation is gated behind can admin federation() (node superadmin), not a tenant write capability. A tenant-B admin can no longer list, admit, or reject tenant-A's quarantined facts.

Workarounds

None other than upgrading to 0.9.0a12. Single-tenant deployments are unaffected.

Fix

IDOR

Incorrect Authorization

Found an issue in the description? Have something to add? Feel free to write us 👾

Weakness Enumeration

Related Identifiers

GHSA-XHV3-Q4XX-349R

Affected Products

Stigmem-Node