PT-2026-61127 · Linux · Linux

CVE-2026-63811

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Published

2026-07-19

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Updated

2026-07-19

None

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write
When updating an atomic-write file, f2fs write begin() may read the previously written data back from the COW inode: prepare atomic write begin() locates the block in the COW inode and sets use cow, and the read bio is then built with the COW inode:
f2fs submit page read(use cow ? F2FS I(inode)->cow inode : inode,
		   ...);
and f2fs grab read bio() decides whether to schedule fs-layer decryption (STEP DECRYPT) for the bio based on that inode via fscrypt inode uses fs layer crypto().
However, the folio being filled belongs to the original inode (folio->mapping->host == inode), and the data stored in the COW block was encrypted (or left as plaintext) using the original inode's context, not the COW inode's -- see f2fs encrypt one page(), which keys off fio->page->mapping->host. fscrypt decrypt pagecache blocks() likewise operates on folio->mapping->host.
The COW inode is created as a tmpfile in the parent directory and inherits its encryption policy from there. With test dummy encryption the newly created COW inode gets the dummy policy and becomes encrypted, while a pre-existing regular file -- created before the policy applied, e.g. already present in the on-disk image -- stays unencrypted. The read path then sets STEP DECRYPT based on the encrypted COW inode and calls fscrypt decrypt pagecache blocks() on a folio whose host (the unencrypted original inode) has a NULL ->i crypt info, dereferencing it:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ... KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] RIP: 0010:fscrypt decrypt pagecache blocks+0xa0/0x310 Workqueue: f2fs post read wq f2fs post read work Call Trace: fscrypt decrypt bio+0x1eb/0x340 f2fs post read work+0xba/0x140 process one work+0x91c/0x1a40 worker thread+0x677/0xe90 kthread+0x2bc/0x3a0
The COW inode is only needed to locate the on-disk block, and that block address is already resolved into @blkaddr by prepare atomic write begin() via find data block(cow inode, ...); f2fs submit page read() then reads from that physical @blkaddr directly, so the inode argument only selects the post-read crypto context, not which block is fetched. Reading with @inode therefore returns the same (latest, not-yet-committed) COW data, while making both the fs-layer decryption decision and the inline crypto path use the correct (original inode's) key.
With the COW inode no longer used at the read site, the use cow flag has no remaining consumer; drop it from f2fs write begin() and prepare atomic write begin().
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Related Identifiers

CVE-2026-63811

Affected Products

Linux