PT-2026-63313 · Go · Code.Gitea.Io/Gitea
CVE-2026-58511
·
Published
2026-07-21
·
Updated
2026-07-21
CVSS v3.1
2.7
Low
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N |
Summary
The
ToHook() function in services/webhook/general.go decrypts the webhook's HeaderAuthorizationEncrypted field and returns the plaintext authorization header in the API response. Any repository admin can read the full plaintext value of webhook authorization headers (Bearer tokens, Basic auth credentials, API keys) set by other admins.The authorization header is stored encrypted in the database using the server's
SecretKey, but ToHook() decrypts it before serializing it into the API response — converting a write-only secret into a readable credential.Vulnerable Code
File:
services/webhook/general.go:407-420go
func ToHook(repoLink string, w *webhook model.Webhook) (*api.Hook, error) {
// ...
authorizationHeader, err := w.HeaderAuthorization() // DECRYPTS from DB
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &api.Hook{
// ...
AuthorizationHeader: authorizationHeader, // PLAINTEXT in response
// ...
}, nil
}Decryption function:
models/webhook/webhook.go:209-216go
func (w Webhook) HeaderAuthorization() (string, error) {
if w.HeaderAuthorizationEncrypted == "" {
return "", nil
}
return secret.DecryptSecret(setting.SecretKey, w.HeaderAuthorizationEncrypted)
}Affected Endpoints
All call
ToHook():GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks(requires repo admin)GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks/{id}(requires repo admin)GET /api/v1/admin/hooks(requires site admin)GET /api/v1/orgs/{org}/hooks(requires org admin)GET /api/v1/user/hooks(requires authenticated user)
Steps to Reproduce
- Admin A creates a webhook with a sensitive authorization header.
- Admin B (different repo admin) lists webhooks via
GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks. - The API response includes the full plaintext authorization header set by Admin A.
Impact
- Cross-admin secret exposure on shared repositories
- Credential harvesting if a repo admin's Gitea token is stolen
- External service compromise via leaked Bearer tokens and API keys
- Undermines the intentional encryption-at-rest protection
Suggested Fix
The authorization header should be write-only. Return a masked/redacted version or a boolean
has authorization header flag instead.References
- Vulnerable function:
services/webhook/general.go:392-425 - Decryption function:
models/webhook/webhook.go:209-216 - Verified against commit 19f0169
Fix
Information Disclosure
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Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Code.Gitea.Io/Gitea