PT-2026-63392 · Nlnet · Unbound

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CVE-2026-56416

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Published

2026-07-22

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Updated

2026-07-22

CVSS v3.1

4.8

Medium

VectorAV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
In NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.1, when the validator builds the canonical RDATA form for an RRSIG-covered PX/RP/MINFO/SOA RRset, it computes the address of the second embedded domain name as 'datstart + dname valid(datstart, ...)' and passes it straight to 'query dname tolower()' without checking that a second name is actually present in the RDATA. The wire-format parser accepts multi-dname RRs whose RDATA ends after the first name, so an attacker who runs a DNSSEC-signed authoritative server can deliver a record with an absent second domain name (e.g. SOA record) and cause 'query dname tolower()' to walk label-by-label through stale bytes in the per-worker 'env->scratch buffer', past the end of that heap allocation if 'msg-buffer-size' has been lowered from the default. This leads to heap buffer overflow and on a release build the outcome relies heavily on the contents of the buffer tail and the adjacent heap chunk.

Fix

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Weakness Enumeration

Related Identifiers

CVE-2026-56416

Affected Products

Unbound