PT-2026-64666 · Linux · Linux
CVE-2026-64445
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Published
2026-07-25
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Updated
2026-07-25
None
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth()
OnAuth() has two bugs in the shared-key authentication path.
When the Privacy bit is set, rtw wep decrypt() is called without
verifying that the frame is long enough to contain a valid WEP IV and
ICV. Inside rtw wep decrypt(), length is computed as:
length = len - WLAN HDR A3 LEN - iv len
and then passed as (length - 4) to crc32 le(). If len is less than
WLAN HDR A3 LEN + iv len + icv len (32 bytes), length - 4 is negative
and, after the implicit cast to size t, causes crc32 le() to read far
beyond the frame buffer. Add a minimum length check before accessing
the IV field and calling the decryption path.
When processing a seq=3 response, rtw get ie() stores the Challenge
Text IE length in ie len, but the subsequent memcmp() always reads 128
bytes regardless of ie len. IEEE 802.11 mandates a challenge text of
exactly 128 bytes; reject any IE whose length field differs, matching
the check already applied to OnAuthClient().
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Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Linux