PT-2026-30338 · Crates.Io · Libp2P-Rendezvous
Published
2026-04-04
·
Updated
2026-04-04
·
CVE-2026-35457
CVSS v3.1
8.2
High
| AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H |
Summary
The rendezvous server stores pagination cookies without bounds. An unauthenticated peer can repeatedly issue
DISCOVER requests and force unbounded memory growth.Details
Pagination state is stored in:
HashMap<Cookie, HashSet<RegistrationId>>
On
Message::Discover:remote peer
→ DISCOVER
→ handle request
→ registrations.get(...)
→ new cookie generated
→ cookie inserted into Registrations::cookies
There is no upper bound or eviction policy, so repeated DISCOVER requests grow this map indefinitely.
PoC
A reproduction test and minimal harness will be provided in a private fork in a follow-up comment.
Impact
Remote state amplification leading to memory exhaustion.
Properties:
- etwork reachable
- no authentication required
- low attack complexity
- protocol-compliant traffic
Impacts rendezvous nodes exposed to untrusted peers.
Possible Fixes
- Global cap + eviction
Bound cookie storage (
MAX COOKIES TRACKED) with FIFO/expiry aware eviction.
Tradeoff: attacker can churn cookies and evict legitimate pagination state.- Stateless cookies
Encode pagination state in authenticated cookies instead of storing server-side state.
Tradeoff: more complex implementation.
- Rate limiting / per-peer quotas
Limit cookie creation per peer.
Tradeoff: requires peer tracking.
Fix
Allocation of Resources Without Limits
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Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Libp2P-Rendezvous